DNSBL - DNS-basierte Blacklist5 min read4 sections

False-Positive Protection (Whitelists, Tor & dnswl)

How the network avoids mis-listing legitimate infrastructure: internal whitelists, dnswl.org reputation, tor exit handling and automatic score decay.

01

The Protection Layers

False positives are the biggest risk for any blacklist service. The Attack Defense Network uses five independent layers to prevent mis-listing legitimate infrastructure:

  1. Cautious listing principle: a single report (token or anonymous - every report counts equally) only reaches the watchlist. Two independent reports list the IP (soft-listed), critical categories (malware, botnet) list with one report - this prevents arbitrary listings.
  2. Reporter reputation: trusted reporters weigh more, false-positive-prone reporters are automatically downweighted.
  3. Internal whitelist: administrators maintain CIDR whitelists; whitelisted IPs are never listed.
  4. dnswl.org reputation: mail servers listed on the dnswl.org whitelist receive reduced signal weight for mail services (smtp-auth, imap, pop3) - a whitelisted server can still be compromised, so we soften but do not silence.
  5. Tor exit handling: tor exit nodes are flagged in the evidence instead of being treated like normal attackers; they are never notified to abuse desks (shared infrastructure, operators cannot act).
02

Tor Exit Nodes

Tor exit nodes generate constant attack traffic from shared IP addresses. Blocking a tor exit affects all users of that exit - a policy decision each administrator must make for themselves.

How we handle tor exits

  • Reports from tor exits are still scored (the attacks are real).
  • The evidence is flagged with tor-exit - filter it in your firewall rules if you want to allow tor.
  • No abuse-desk notifications are sent for tor exits (the operators cannot act on them).

The list is refreshed hourly from check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist.

03

dnswl.org Whitelist

dnswl.org maintains a DNS-based whitelist of mail servers with verified good sending behaviour. We query it for reports against mail services (smtp-auth, imap, pop3).

Effect

  • Trust level 0-1: no adjustment (unknown or low trust).
  • Trust level 2-3 (medium/high): signal weight is halved and the evidence is flagged with dnswl-2 / dnswl-3.

Why not exclude entirely? A whitelisted mail server can be compromised and start sending attacks. Reduced weight means the listing still happens - it just needs more corroboration. This mirrors how blocklist.de uses dnswl.org, with a finer-grained response.

Note: We do not use the commercial Spamhaus whitelist feed; dnswl.org covers the same protection goal via public DNS.

04

Your Own Whitelist

Never list your own infrastructure: add your IP ranges to the internal whitelist so your monitoring and security systems are not reported by accident.

Whitelist requests: contact us with the CIDR ranges you operate. Whitelisted ranges are excluded from all listing decisions and are visible in the check API as whitelisted: true.